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Book Reviews 
The Fate of Eloquence in the Age of Hume by Adam Potkay. Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1994. Pp. 272. $36.95. 
In this book, Adam Potkay argues that eighteenth-century literature and 
politics might best be understood in terms of an ongoing dialectic between 
eloquence and politeness. He links each of these to a specific set of political 
commitments, with eloquence coding for the values of ancients, Tories, the 
Country writers, and the Opposition to Walpole, and with politeness coding 
for the interests of the moderns, the Court, new VVhigs, and an emerging 
bourgeoisie. 
As the dialectic works itself out, politeness "gains ascendancy over, but 
never manages to silence, the nascent republican ideal of eloquence and its 
masculinist political assumptions" (1). In the end it is Macpherson's Poems of 
Ossian that achieves "an ideal reconciliation of eighteenth-century opposi-
tions .. . the passionate fierceness of the citizen-warrior blends with the deli-
cate affections fostered by domesticity; precommercial virtue joins with 
modern mam1ers" (206). 
The "fate" of eloquence, then, in the period 1730-1770 is to be simultane-
ously invoked and lamented, invoked in a nostalgic appeal to a receding tra-
dition of civic humanism and republican virtue, regretted because the times 
no longer seem right for a new Demosthenes, both because the Opposition 
has no senate to convince and because Enlightenment skepticism and an 
emerging ideology of politeness have begun to render eloquence a species of 
demagoguery and bad manners. 
Potkay devotes somewhat less attention to the formation of politeness than 
to the survival of eloquence, but this is only because, with the work of J. G. 
A. Pocock and his followers, especially Lawrence Klein (Shaftesbury and the 
Culture of Politeness, [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994]), it is 
assumed that a nascent middle class consolidated its political authority 
through the myriad codes simultaneously and effectively imposed by dis-
plays of maill1ered behavior and polite writing. While Klein ties the dis-
course of politeness to the interests of a new Whig regime, Potkay shows 
how the rhetoric of eloquence (though perhaps not eloquence itself) could be 
restored, alongside wishes for the restoration of the Stuart line. 
Potkay calls this period "the age of Hume" because he finds in "Of Elo-
quence" an exemplary ambivalence between ancient oratory and modern 
politeness. '''Of Eloquence' bespeaks at once a fascination with, and a dis-
tance from, the power of figurative eloquence it evokes. . [an ambivalence} 
that characterizes the political and aesthetic discourses of midcentury Brit-
ain" (29). While one might read "Of Eloquence" as a studied demystification 
of eloquence through an inquiry into the historical conditions that effectively 
damp inflamed oratory; while Hume concludes his essay with the advice 
that" our modern authors should not elevate their stile or aspire to rivalship 
with the ancient," but should instead "observe a method, and make that 
method conspicuous to the hearers"; Potkay holds that Hume's philosophical 
suspicion of eloquence is subservient to nostalgia for a lost ideal, a nostalgia 
rooted in the need for a new Demosthenes to challenge the modern Philip 
(Walpole). Thus, Hume's "ending call for expository cohesion does not 'rise 
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nahlrally' from his earlier argument [but] seems curiously like a digression, 
an afterthought" (28). 
Potkay offers forceful readings of Pope, Gray, Hume, Sterne, and Mac-
pherson in order to bear out his claim that a dialogue between eloquence 
and politeness shapes both the style and substance of canonical eighteenth-
century works. His book is most effective in drawing attention to the fre-
quency with which social and political oppositions were recast in terms of an 
ongoing debate over the status of eloquence and polite style. In a representa-
tive example, Potkay addresses the obvious objection that "polite ideology" 
does not seem an adequate description of a period during which satire was a 
dominant genre. Potkay holds, however, that Pope's Dunciad, despite its 
pissing contests and ritual annihilation of dunces, qualifies as a polite work 
Ambivalence toward any direct appeal to rhetorical action leads Pope to 
encapsulate his invective in the patina of what Potkay calls "a polite antivi-
sualism" and an "anticorporeal eloquence." Pope "balances the moral enthu-
siasm he learned frOln Bolingbroke with a more savvy 'Horatian' sense of 
detachment" (122), with the result that "Pope's late poetry. . wields a Prot-
estant poetics against the various idol worshippers of the day" (129). The 
Dunciad accordingly "ranks not only as one of the most punitive poems in 
English literature but also among the most polite" (130). This reluctant drift 
toward the dominant ideology is matched on the other side by Sterne's nov-
els, in which we find more direct endorsements of the new hegemony: Tris-
tram Shandy is "a Whig satire in the tradition of Addison's de Coverley I 
papers" (153); while "A Sentimental Journey may be read as Steme's fable of 1\, 
the ways in which commerce ... supplants traditional forms of rhetoric with 
the new imperatives of polite style" (143). 
In his introductory "Discourse on Method," Potkay links the kind of liter-
ary history he is practicing here with the "movement" for which John Bender 
supplied a recent manifesto: "I would like to situate my work in relation to a 
hypothetical mainstream of new historicism" (12-l3). What participation in 
the movement requires in the present case are the following assumptions: 1) 
that rhetorical gestures like eloquence and politeness serve as tropes for spe-
cific ideological interests (Potkay calls his book "a post de-Manian history" 
of tropes); 2) that a Hegelian dialectic plots the historical relation between 
contested categories, such that they are reconciled or syntheSized in an 
'fideal" unity; and 3) that we may diagnose and overcome the errors of the 
past by studying history in the manner of the new historicism (Potkay 
writesf "I have no activist aspirations to hasten its [polite ideology'S] demise 
and usher in a classless society, although I am sure that this book, as an ex-
pose of the power relations that lie at the heart of politeness, might afford 
ammunition for those less comfortable with the class system than I am" [18-
19]). Potkay has written a useful book despite these assumptions, and much 
of his evidence strains against his opening "Discourse on Method." 
Begirming with the equation of tropes and ideologies, what needs to be 
questioned is whether the view of rhetoric as a system of tropes and figures 
is adequate to the role of rhetoric in the eighteenth century. Potkay chooses 
to employ "a limited use of the term rhetoric," defining it as lithe art of de-
scribing, analyzing, and systematizing the eloquence of the past" (1). The 
bracketing off of a more inclusive definition of rhetoric is hardly incidental 
I 
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to Potkay's project. For if we define rhetoric, with Aristotle, as "the faculty of 
observing in any given case the available means of persuasion/' then elo-
quence for the accomplished speaker would amount to one of several 
"means of persuasion" that could be called upon lIin any given case," that is, 
when circumstances demand. Among the other tactics in the speaker's per-
suasive arsenal would also no doubt be If softer" means of persuasion, like 
politeness. The foremost quality of rhetoric so conceived would be the devel-
opment (usually through a course of instruction) of a faculty for ascertaining 
the kind of cliscourse appropriate to different purposes and audiences. One 
would then expect accomplished speakers and writers of all political persua-
sions to put their rhetorical education to work identifying those forms most 
likely to gain the assent of their audiences. In this case, however, it becomes 
far more difficult to assign ideologies and epistemologies to specific rhetori-
cal strategies. Ronald Reagan and Woody Guthrie were both folksy. 
Despite the use of eloquence and politeness as tropes for Tory (ancient) 
and Whig (modern) interests, Potkay acknowledges that more than one party 
rallied behind the banner of ancient eloquence. In his cliscussion of the DUI1-
ciad, Potkay observes that Pope's primary representative of the debasement 
of ancient eloquence was John "Orator" Henley. Henley was a pedagogue 
who sought to "revive an ancient Athenian and Roman school of philosophy, 
rhetoric, and elocution" in order "to supply the want of an university, or 
universal school in this capital, for the equal benefit of persons of all ranks, 
professions, circumstances, and capacities" (107, lll). Potkay sides with 
Pope in likening Henley'S plan to a "hucksters pitch" delivered witl1 
"puffing assurance and a degree of charlatry ... [that] smacks of heroic dra-
ma" (107-108). It would seem that when a populist advocates the revival of 
eloquence, he becomes, in Pope and Potkay's terms, a leveler and haranguer 
(lll, ll2); yet when Pope and Bolingbroke appeal to the "democratic" ideal 
of Demosthenean eloquence, they qualify as defenders of Republican virtue 
and "Liberty." The battle described here seems to be less between eloquence 
and politeness, and more between those who would extend and those who 
would restrict the use of classical rhetoric to educate the masses. Pope and 
the ancients could not affirm the efficacy of ancient eloquence without ac-
knowledging the dangers posed when training in the arts of effective public 
discourse fell into the wrong hands. 
Elsewhere Potkay notes the eighteenth-century commonplace that the 
same rhetorical mode could be appropriated by competing interests. Elo-
quence is especially versatile in this way. In Thomson's "Liberty" we read 
that "tl1e power of ELOQUENCE at large/ Breath'd the persuasive or pa-
thetic soul./ Still'd by degrees tl1e democratic storm,! Or bad it threatening 
rise, and tyrants shook" (in Potkay, 34). Eloquence stills 01' raises the demo-
cratic storm, a point that was not lost upon Pope when he attacked Henley. 
Similarly, Lyttelton, although dubbed tl1e Demosthenes of the Opposition, 
"casts a cold glance at eloquence ... " (55). And Potkay also observes that in 
an early draft of the "Elegy in a Country Churchyard," Gray gives us "some 
mute inglorious Tully" instead of Milton. No wonder Opposition ,vriters 
were nervous about invoking eloquence! They may well have fixed on De-
mosthenes in order to avoid the appearance of being rhetorical bedfellows 
with Crom\vell's secretary. Mary V\Tortley Montagu was alert to this point: 
334 Criticism, Vol. XXXVIII, No.2: Book Reviews 
"You stand the champion of the people's cause," she has Pope ventriloquize 
to Bolingbroke, "And bid the mob reform defective laws'; Oh! was your 
pOW'Y, like your intention, good!/ Your native land wou'd stream with civic 
blood" ("Epistle from Pope to Lord Bolingbroke," in Potkay, 129). 
Potkay's decision to align his work with the new historicislTI brings with it 
in addition a commitment to dialectical historiography as a means of narrat-
ing the fate of eloquence. But the demands of a dialectically engineered plot 
also explain some of the book's omissions. Potkay rules out discussion of 
pulpit oratory (where the "politics" of eloquence would become far more in-
volved). He indicates that he will not discuss female writers, who, "major 
and minor ... tend to champion the new ideology of politeness without the 
ambivalence of their male contemporaries: for why should any woman 
writer desire, even halfheartedly, a return to the rigidly sexist communi-
tarian assumptions of Demosthenes' Athens?" (8), even though female writ-
ers from Aphra Behn to Mary Wollstonecraft did attempt to steal the fire of 
"male" eloquence, and many felt debarr'd from the polite ideal as it was 
being formulated by passed-over neoclassicists. And he seems reluctant to 
acknowledge a similar tension between eloquence and politeness in writers 
before Hume, most notably Dryden and Shaftesbury. In his "Defence of the 
Epilogue," Dryden, riding the crest of a restored Stuart monarchy, attacks 
the verbal excesses of the preceding period (concentrated into Elizabethen 
drama) and calls for kinds of writing that are polished, conversible, urbane, 
elegant, in a word, polite. Progress in the arts here dictates a return to Hor-
ace and Virgil, bypassing Shakespeare and downplaying the Greeks. Stuart 
interests at this time were consonant with the moderation of inflamed ora-
tory. In the next generation, his grandfather'S VVhig revolution haVing been 
largely effected, it is the third Earl of Shaftesbury's tum to write against en-
thusiasm and false eloquence (e.g., in the "Letter concerning Enthusiasm") 
and to advocate a polite and mannered style. 
Without denying that eloquence did come to serve in the period 1720-1740 
as an Opposition shibboleth, we nevertheless need to ask whether the history 
of eighteenth-century rhetoric is best narrated through a dialectical interplay 
of politicized and gendered tropes (eloquence and politeness), staging the 
same ideological opposition whether found in critical essays by skeptical 
philosophers, mock epics, verse satires, elegies, sentimental novels, heroic 
romances, or classroom rhetorics. 
Finally, The Fate of Eloquence in the Age of Hume, asks to be read as an 
"expose of the power relations that lie at the heart of politeness" (18). But 
what if rhetoric, conceived outside an aesthetic framework, teaches polite-
ness as one of several tactics that may be used to gain power? VVhat if what 
Hume does when he recasts his precise philosophy in polite essays is not an 
"implicit 'Emily Post-ism'" (87), but instead is an attempt to extend the tech-
niques of Enlightenment skepticism (historicism, the critique of necessary 
connection) to new readers, especially women? Predictably, Potkay compares 
these attempts to popularize difficult concepts and methodologies to a retro-
grade "fair-sexing" of male discourse. In the implicit view that "feminine" 
genres were somehow more accessible, passionless, and polite, he finds a 
justification for invoking Thomas Lacquer's "contention that mid-eighteenth-
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to generation" (81n). Just as he carul0t take Pope's Henley seriously, so here 
Potkay must ridicule the historical role "polite" or familiar genres played in 
diffusing cultural literacy. In Rasselas, when Pekuah and the Princess save 
the mad astronomer through conversation, they are not repeating an ideol-
ogy of politeness, as Potkay maintains, but are instead setting forth a peda-
gogy by means of generic mediation, leading the astronomer from where he 
falsely believed power lies, in the discursive isolation of his own imagina-
tion, to an arena where he might exercise his intellect to effect. 'What are the 
"politics" of a kind of historicism that casts vague aspersions on the peda-
gogical effort to diffuse difficult knowledge to new readers through conver-
sational genres? Is this an expose of power relations or an obfuscation of 
them? 
The Fate of Eloquence in the Age of Hume is a book that will prompt new 
studies of rhetoric in the eighteenth century; in its scholarship, if not in its 
theorizing, it is an important work. 
Boston University Michael Prince 
The Power of Lies: Transgression in Victorian Fiction by John Kucich. Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1995. Pp. 304. $39.95, cloth; $15.95, paper. 
The SOCiology of knowledge continues to provide fruitf~l lines of inquiry 
for literary critics. Alexander Welsh's George Eliot and Blackmail (1985), D. A. 
Miller's The Novel and the Police (1988), and W. David Shaw's Victorians and 
Mystery: Crises of Representation (1990) are among the precursors to the book 
W1der review which have usefully engaged Foucault Bourdieu, Sinunel and 
others to address literary practices as means of distributing symbolic power. 
Distinct from studies sucll as Nina Auerbach's Private Theatricals (1990), Ku-
cich's book considers deceit not as a form of higher truth but, by maintaining 
truth and lies as separate ethical categories, as an "arbitrary overcoding of 
one forbidden aspect of experience with psychic value" (31). Building on the 
Bakhtinian and psychoanalytic account of transgression developed by Peter 
Stallybrass and Allan White in The Politics and Poetics of Transgression (1986), 
Kucich argues that lithe transgression of distinctions between honesty and 
dishonesty was pivotal in struggles for middle-class cultural authority" (37). 
Notorious for both eamesh1ess and hypocrisy, the Victorian bourgeoisie 
affords ample material for a consideration of the power of lies. Kucich re-
marks that lying has, however, been overlooked as a viable mechanism of 
resistance against institutional technologies of truth by Foucauldians who 
collapse confession into economies of power. At the same time, Kucich re-
calls the bourgeois habit of stigmatizing women, foreigners, and the working 
class as liars. Through readings of three pairs of writers-Anthony Trollope 
and Wilkie Collins, Elizabeth Gaskell and Ellen Wood, and Thomas Hardy 
and Sarah Grand-Kucich describes the diverse motives for appropriating 
the symbolic power of lies and its consequences for various groups within 
and outside the bourgeOisie. 
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The book's first pairing of Trollope and Collins best illustrates Kucich's 
method of argument. Choosing writers long thought to represent respec-
tively the quintessence of middle-class stodginess and subversive deviance, 
Kucich demonstrates their common effort to define a bourgeois elite whose 
moral sophistication proceeds from transgressive deceit. Kucich's goal, how-
ever, is not to reduce their alleged differences to political insignificance, but 
rather to refine our appreciation of what distinguishes Trollope from Collins. 
With evidence drawn from a range of Trollope's novels as well as his au-
tobiography, Kucich argues that Trollope negotiates the conflict in bourgeois 
ideology between the disinterest required for trustworthiness and the desire 
required for social mobility, capitalist expansion, and sexual relations by re-
cuperating lying for an anti-bourgeois elite. At the same time Trollope dem-
onstrates his commitment to honesty as a moral and aesthetic virtue and 
disparages overtly self-interested mendacity, he likewise mocks gullibility 
and slavish adherence to absolute rules of honesty and associates moral so-
phistication with the ability to transgress such rules by "disinterested dis-
honesty." Lucy Robarts's falsehoods in Framley Parsonage, presented as signs 
of charming selflessness rather than ambition, are paradigmatic of the behav-
ior of the Trollopean elite, whose moral authority is based in the exercise of 
transgressive desire. Adducing Stallybrass and White, Kucich claims that the 
recuperation of transgressive energies, which have been projected onto other 
groups, not only characterizes bourgeois identity, but is an instrument in in-
traclass warfare. 
Wilkie Collins shares with Trollope the desire to distingUish an elite group 
within bourgeois culture, according to Kucich. This view of Collins departs 
from that of critics such as U. C. Knoepflmacher and Winifred Hughes on 
the one hand, who have construed Collins as challenging middle-class con-
ventions, and critics including Nancy Armstrong and D. A. Miller on the 
other, who have more recently emphasized the disciplinary function of Vic-
torian fiction. Kucich wishes to attend to the symbolic strategy of Collins's 
public identification with outsider status by comparison with Trollope's affil-
iation with insiders. Collins repeatedly opposes "cultural intellectuals" to le-
gal, medical, and other professionals in order to demonstrate that not only 
can intellectuals master professional standa~ds of probity, but, by virtue of 
their superior aesthetic powers, surpass other bourgeois in their abilities to 
detect deception and reveal suppressed narratives. Collins' anti-profes-
sionalism qualifies htm as a critic of the institutional markers of legitimacy, 
but the transgressions of his protagonists, most notably Walter in The Woman 
in White, are not oppositional, but accomplish the justice the law cannot. 
Their outsider status, especially in its characteristic suspicion, enables cul-
tural intellectuals "to see and tell what professional 'insiders' most want to 
know" (118). 
Gender is clearly significant in Trollope's and Collins's treatments of lying, 
as Kucich notes, and he focuses specifically on gender in chapters on Eliza-
beth Gaskell and Ellen Wood. Their principal difference, as Kucich sees it, is 
that "Gaskell was able to adapt middle-class concepts of transgression for 
purposes of sexual reform, whlle Wood tended to protest-without supply-
ing an alternative-against the class-bound options such transgression 
seemed to leave for women" (122). Acknowledging that Gaskell maintains a 
n 
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strictly gendered division of moral conduct, Kucich argues that attention to 
significant-though exceptional-examples wherein Gaskell presents inver-
sions as productive rather than pathological enables readers to appreciate 
how the conflicts within bourgeois culture themselves invite transgressions 
on the part of Victorian WOlnen. Lies, half-truths, suppressed truths, figure 
prominently in Gaskell's plots, but they do not seem particularly essential to 
the conclusion Kucich draws from his subtle analyses of Gaskell's gender re-
forms. Beyond the "softening" of Mr. Thornton and the "strengthening" of 
Mary Barton, and the pathological weakness of Philip Hepburn and strength 
of Miss Jenkyns, Kucich draws our attention to the culture of Cranford, in 
which "male and female characters together reverse the extended sexual hi-
erarchy that equates verbal dependability with disinterested male public 
power and finesse with private feminine diplomacy" (152). Polite pretense, 
tact, and reticence-what Kucich terms "lies of omission"-simply lack ethi-
cal significance commensurate with statements contrary to fact, or the sup-
pression of evidence. Kucich's gendered ethical categories take a lot of 
elaborating, qualifying, inverting, and re-qualifying to arrive at a fairly mod-
est claim, but critics who have opted for more celebratory or disparaging 
statements on Gaskell's politics have not always read as judiciously. 
Ellen Wood's East Lynne returns to many of the concerns regarding profes-
sional ethics and intraclass conflicts raised in Kucich's chapters on Trollope 
and Collins, with the result that the categories of honesty and dishonesty 
developed there transfer readily and highlight gender as it inflects class. East 
Lynne opens with the sale of property by an aristocrat to a professional, the 
lawyer Carlyle, and its plot hinges on the consequences of Carlyle's marriage 
to the aristocrat's daughter, Isabel. Kucich reads Carlyle as an embodiment 
of the encroaching power of professionals through their expanding clailns of 
expertise. Women cannot be empowered as truth-tellers or liars if they are 
barred from discourse by experts asserting exclusive rights to all areas of ex-
perience, from contracts to the detection of crime to child rearing. In the face 
of such exclusion, Wood presents two disastrous alternatives for women: the 
destruction of traditional maternal authority or women's complicity with the 
professional mentality. 
Thomas Hardy and Sarah Grand, Kucicll argues, responded to such crises 
of representation not by rejecting Victorian ethics outright. Instead, Hardy 
and Grand produced II deformations" made up of the If discursive debris" of 
Victorian ethics (Kucich locates "deformation" in Stallybrass and White's 
lTIodel of historical transformation as following fragmentation, and prior to 
marginalization and sublimation), in order to perform unfamiliar ideological 
work. Many of Kucich's conclusions regarding Hardy and Grand are quite 
familiar; one should hardly demand radical departures from the general con-
sensus on such extensively studied novels as Tess and Jude. Rather, Kucich 
aims to alert us to an unfamiliar genealogy for Hardy'S mascuIinist aesthet-
ics and Grand's radical moral experimentation that restores the symbolic 
power of truth-telling discourses, largely absent from our own critical dis-
cussions of "violence, domination, and othenless." 
Kucich argues that Hardy'S position develops out of his adherence to the 
Victorian equation between dishonesty and desire-sexual and social. As 
sexual desire came to be understood according to deterministic models, 
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questions of intentionality became vexed and "the moral axis of honesty and 
dishonesty hopelessly problematic" (207). In The Well-Beloved (1897 version), 
Tess, and Jude, desire leads inevitably to betrayal and only the artist can es-
cape desire, even that of the famously appropriative masculine gaze identi-
fied in Hardy's novels by Kaja Silverman, Penny Boumehla, and Rosemarie 
Morgan. Kucich claims that Hardy doubles the male gaze, projecting men-
dacity onto the social and sexual desires of female characters, granting mo-
ments of disinterested observation to male characters (e.g., Jude viewing 
Arabella with "the eye of a dazed philosopher"), and removing the sexually 
coded observer/artist to a position of true aesthetic perception, distinctive of 
modernism. 
New Woman novelists, like Sarah Grand, faced an impasse-both political 
and aesthetic-identified in Wood's fiction, and exacerbated by the growing 
modernist identification of h'aditionally feminine qualities, such as senti-
ment, with falsehood. Grand's fiction embraces contradictory formulations of 
feminist ethics, advocating on the one hand a version of Victorian male 
honor and authority accomplished by felnale triumph over sexual self-inter-
est and on the other a notion of identity as performativef enabling women to 
appropriate the symbolic power of transgressive lying. Grand could not fi-
nesse the contradiciion that critics have charged mars The Heavenly Twins, 
The Beth BODle, and Ideala, because, Kucich arguesf it would have been impos-
sible for her to ignore the persistent equations between honesty and authori-
ty, dishonesty and women, as well as the dilemma these equations posed for 
feminism. Kucich considers Beth to be Grand's best" attempt at synthesizing 
opposing values, a character who, despite her pious frauds, can declare "I 
alll always in earnest." This seems to be, however, not so much an example 
of transgressive lying, but of lying in service of a higher truth, such as one 
finds in the analyses of masked selves-Auerbach's, for example-against 
which Kucich defines his own argument. Nevertheless, Kucich raises impor-
tant questions for current theories which reproduce the Victorian habit of 
"surrendering issues of truth-telling in art to men" (202). 
Marquette Universittj Christine 1. Krueger 
Allegories of America: Narratives, Metaphysics, Politics by Frederick M. Dolan. 
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994. Pp. x + 232. $36.50, cloth; 
$15.95, paper. 
Frederick Dolan announces his conception of Allegories of America: Narra-
tives, Metaphysics, Politics with the statement that the 
themes I explore in this book [are] ... the spaces opened up for power 
in an interpretively open world; the latent metaphysics of a politics en-
tirely given over to phantasms and simulacra but whose actors are 
driven by the need to reduce the interpretive ambiguity of their world 
to the reassuring forms of a metaphysical allegory; the affirmation of 
America as a privileged locus of such experiences; and the indispensa-
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bility of fiction for registering the complex ironies generated by this 
situation. .. Holding these readings together is the conviction that 
such discourses allegorize the central problematic that post-Nietz-
schean and post-Heideggerian reflection offers to political theory: that 
of speaking, acting, and judging 'without grounds,' the withering 
away of transcendental normative principles invoked to anchor politi-
cal actions, judgments, opinion." (2-3) 
Chapter 1, "The Fiction of America," gives a reading of John Winthrop's ser-
mon, "A Modell of Christian Charity," based in part on the work of Jean-Luc 
Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. The sermon is taken to depict the yet-
to-be-found "America" of Winthrop's company in terms of the rhetorical tra-
dition of his time, as understood by a certain tradition of our own time, 
passing through Nietzsche, Heidegger, and deconstruction. Chapter 2, 
"America's Critique of Reason," presents a reading of some of the anti-Fed-
eralist documents in the debate over the U. S. Constitution. Dol~n brings 
Habermas into his account at this point (as well as Sloterdijk and Zitek), to 
discuss what he calls the "Newtonian rationality of the Federalists" on the 
one hand, and the "hermeneutics of suspicion of the anti-Federalists," on the 
other hand. Dolan wishes to demonstrate "the unavoidability of fictions in 
opening up and preserving public spaces and [to expose] the dilemmas 
posed by the idea of a democratic public sphere." The third chapter, "Cold 
War Metaphysics/' is devoted to the often-noted observation that much of 
the writing about America during the Cold War was allegorical. Although 
allegory is an ancient practice, Dolan diagnoses it in this case as post-modern 
and "metaphysical because it is organized around what Derrida calls 'fear of 
writing,' that is, the anxiety provoked by the effects of nonobligated or un-
motivated linguistic Signs." 
Chapter 4 "Fiction and the Dilenuna of Poshnodern Politics" is a reading 
of the later works of William Burroughs and James Merrill. "This chapter 
asks what it would mean to take their fiction seriously as thought and phi-
losophy, its guiding question being Habermas's distinction betvveen 'serious' 
and 'fictive' discourse." The last chapter of Allegories of America, "Practicing 
Political Theory Otherwise," is a reading of Hannah Arendt's On Revolution. 
"Through the figure of Arendt's reflections on the American Revolution, this 
chapter reflects on the inner and mutually illuminating relationships among 
and between the workings of foundationalist metaphysics, the practice of 
political theory, and the question of America" (8-10). 
Dolan's chapter on literature-the chapter that will be of most interest to 
readers of Criticism-seeks the typicality of postvvar literature in the United 
States in the later works of Burroughs and Merrill. A narrative that moves 
from Winthrop to Merrill is sufficiently unusua] as to merit some considera-
tion as to its terms. Dolan sees a logic in this progression taking his stand 
with the deconstructionists against Habermas (as he sees them): "Against 
thr e] Habermasian argument, deconstructionists point to the way in which 
the allegedly serious, literal discourses of everyday life are in fact permeated 
with symbolic, fictional constructs and conventional, ritualized meanings. If 
the communication of a meaning demands linguistic convention, then all 
communication is play-acting, all meaning fictional, all reason "mere" COll-
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vention" (114-15). A reader is puzzled to know what it may mean, when 
reading Burroughs and Merrill, "to take their fiction seriously as thought 
"od philosophy." And it may be asked, why just those? But then we note 
Dolan's belief that "Burroughs'S strategy ... is based on a claim about the 
nature of authority and its lmdoing that resembles, in essential respects, de 
Man's in The Resistance to Theory: authority depends on the fiction of refer-
ence or meaning, and authority can be undone, therefore, by exploding such 
fictions, not by producing" new myth or reality-telling yet another story-
but by making clear the fictitious character of reality as a narrative process 
and so milking l"ngu"ge useless for purposes of domination ... " (124). The 
association of Burroughs with de Man, it seems, is a rhetorical strategy 
meant to invest the former with the authority of the latter. Novels that ap-
pear to be mannered efforts at comic pornography can be read as libertine 
\\'orks, 5adean projects to liberate the-white, male, leisured-individual 
from the demands of the State. The savage misogyny of these Boys Life Cilr-
loons can become representative of the Nietzschean therapeutic. In the same 
way, Merrill, who appears as an inadequate descendent, perhaps, of Wallace 
Stevens, becomes something much more to the political point. Dolan writes, 
apparently without irony, that "The distinction between the elite soul densi-
ties \vho perform 'V Work' and the animal souls who merely live and die 
\'\'ithout a trace. . plays in Merrill's poem essentially the same role as the 
one Arendt assigns to her distinction bet'\veen Action and labor, namely, ac-
tion (political action) that enables the construction of a durable ... identity, 
and action (social action) tllat has no end beyond that of sheer reproduction" , I 
(153). Here a radically anti-democratic world view is authorized by reference 
to a theoretician of revolution. 
Arendt is popular enough now. In what used to be called Central Europe, 
her HUll/ali Condition has replaced Capital as a sacred, unread text. Her dis-
tinctions between work and labor, on the one hand, and action and contem-
plation, on the other, are partially classical, and partially a contribution for 
our own time. She was a sociologist of politics, deeply rooted in the Ger-
ll1<1ny of her youth and as marked by the France of the Third Republic as by 
mid-century America. She saw political structures as dynamic, flowing-in 
her time all too often ebbing-so that the areas of human action contract 
from the full humanity of the tripartite arena for action composed of the po-
litic<1l, the soci;:d, and the intimate, to that collapse of public life into the inti-
111<1le itself that she took to be characteristic of totalitarian societies. It is not 
too much to S<1Y th<1t this process was for her an essential part of the great 
tr.lgedy of our century. She viewed post-\var developments in Germany \-vith 
mingled hope ,llld skepticism, as her homeland struggled to re-establish first 
soci,1I then political institutions. She did not live long enough to see the 
S,1J1ll' process take place in the former areas of actually existing socialism, It 
is difficult tn belic\'c that thCfC is Jnything in Arendt's thought comp<1rZlble 
tn the essl'ntialist elitism of Merrill, to belie\·e that she would be anything 
()thl'r th<1!1 Zlppalled by Zlssoci<1tinn with his vicws, 
D()t.m'." l'ssa~· on liter<HY matters is puzzling, odd in its choice of <1uthors, 
odd in its judgment abuut them, odd in its associ<1tions. These matters seem 
tn be inherent in his under."t,lnding of the method of deconstruction. VVe 
h,1\"L' bl'come [,lmili"r with till' w"y in which the communication of idea.", 
..J 
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methodsr and theories from one tradition to another can be distorted by a 
characteristic type of noise in the system, the habit of imagining that the 
ideas in question are familiar, the problems dealt with by the theories are 
familiar, and the methods, if novel, are autonomous, easily transferred to 
new questions, new problems. Wittgenstein appeared in Cambridge as one 
more logician, working his way through Russell's questions and problems, 
developing strikingly novel methods that seemed to bring into being an en-
tirely new "turn" in English philosophy: that associated with Ordinary Lan-
guage Analysis, the English version of the linguistic turn of twentieth-
century thought. And yet it now appears that Wittgenstein was not simply 
one more English logician, that his thought was not moving in the channel 
Russell had marked out for it, that he was, as should always have been ob-
vious, a philosopher in the Viennese tradition, concerned with questions that 
were not questions in Cambridge, working out methods to apply to prob-
lems that were not problems in Cambridge. This is not to say that postvvar 
English philosophy was simply a misunderstanding, but it is to say that 
there must have been some very compelling cultural or ideological reason to 
accept the results, as startling as they were, of adopting a methodology that 
was taken as rejecting wholesale the entire classical tradition. There is not a 
problem in principle in the transfer of a theory or method from one culture 
or field to another. There are times when this can be quite fruitful. Those en-
gaging in such transfers have a scholarly responsibility to be aware of the 
original context and use of the theory, and to consider just why such a graft 
becomes attractive in the new context, how the change in context affects the 
use of the theory or method, what there is about the moment that demands 
just this importation. 
It is possible that the American reception of deconstruction merits consid-
erations of this order. French university students can be expected to have 
read certain set texts: Plato, Descartes, Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche; Rous-
seau, Montesquieu. French philosophers can assmne this background, and 
not another, and with it can assume a focus on certain questions, a prefer-
ence for certain Inethods, a valuation of certain intellectual styles. In France, 
a philosophy of puns will appeal to those who lmderstand the puns, offer 
some amusement, perhaps some insights, as an addition to, not as a replace-
ment for, a certain dialectical h·adition. But puns do not translate well, play-
fulness becomes doctrinaire in a foreign language, and the commonplace 
that much of communication takes a shared linguistic form can become a 
blinding intellectual nihilism. Derrida is, as is well-known, a man of the Left, 
and in France his work is part of a dialogue with Sartre, de Beauvoir, Lacan, 
Althusser, and their successors. But in the United States, it sOlnetimes has 
been heard as a monologue, a pre-emption of critique; as naturalized by De 
Man and others, it can be an elision of categories, a machine, like a certain 
degradation of Ordinary Language Analysis itself, for entertaimnents in the 
seminar room. In literary studies in the United States, deconstruction has 
been used by some as an alternative to methods that seek historical and cul-
tural contexts for their work. Applying it in this way to political science 
brings to mind Walter Benjamin's observation about the aesthetization of 
politics . 
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Dolan's Allegories of America is valuable for its readings of Winthrop and 
the anti-federalists. The method of deconstruction is powerful, in context, 
and properly applied, cast a strong light on the commonalties of all dis-
course. But it is possible to be misled by it, to apply it in ways that are less 
than fruitful, to arrive, however inadvertently, at an intellectual nihilism that 
is, in the end, merely provocative. 
The American Council of Learned Societies Michael Holzman 
A. M. Klein: The Story of the Poet by Zailig Pollock. Toronto, Buffalo, London: 
University of Toronto Press, 1994. Pp. 336. $60.00, cloth; $25.95, paper. 
It is not uncommon for criticism of contemporary literature to favor au-
thors who perform fashionable gestures that identify them with some easily 
recognized school. To discriminate between quality and fashion requires ef-
fort and gets no reward. The result is that fine authors can be buried under 
the journalism that often passes for criticism of modern writing. Among 
overrated Jewish writers are the embarrassing Isaac Bashevis Singer and the 
tiresome Edmond Jabes, admired by Derrida. In criticism of Anglophone 
Canadian literature we find endless accolades to the mediocre fiction of Mar-
garet Atvvood and Robertson Davies; in French-Canadian literature, Nicole 
Brossard is seen as appropriately trendy. Meanwhile, the extraordinary 
proto-"Ianguage poet" Claude Gauvreau is entirely ignored, as is the power-
ful playwright and novelist Michel Tremblay. 
It may be time to repeal Northrop Frye's verdict on Canadian literature, 
pronounced in 1965: " . .. Canada has produced no author who is a classic in 
the sense of possessing a vision greater in kind than that of his best readers . 
. TI1ere is no Canadian writer of whom we can say what we can say of the 
world's major writers, that their readers can grow up inside their work with-
out ever being aware of a circumference." (The Bush Garden [Toronto: Anan-
si, 1971], 213-14). If it is in fact time to repeal this verdict, though, it is still 
not entirely clear who should be nominated for the space that Frye left va-
cant. A. M. Klein is one possible candidate for that place. 
Not that Klein ever achieved great popularity, or has even maintained the 
degree of popularity that he did once have. The University of Toronto Press 
has been engaged for years in the publication of his voluminous works, me-
ticulously edited and exhaustively annotated. Nevertheless, a recent check of 
four Toronto bookstores, including the University's own, failed to turn up a 
single title by Klein. One begins to think that what Harry Levin once said of 
Ben Jonson might be applied, with appropriate modifications, to A. M. Klein: 
"Ben Jonson's position, 300 years after his death, is more than secure; it 
might almost be called impregnable. He is still the greatest unread English 
author" (Ben Jonson: Selected Works [New York: Random House, 1938],1). The 
public response that Klein thought, perhaps unjustly, he had failed to elicit 
during his lifetime, still seems beyond his grasp. Yet Coleridge was little 
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read before Kathleen Coburn's magisterial edition appeared; perhaps some 
similar transformation will take place in the reception of A. M. Klein. 
How good a writer is Klein? Louis Dudek thought the Toronto edition was 
overkill, not worth the enormous effort it has entailed. Pollock's A. M. Klein: 
The Story of the Poet tries to identify a single pattern in everything that Klein 
wrote: for such an enterprise, of course, every fragment, even the proverbial 
laundry list, becomes important. But is Klein necessarily a greater writer if it 
can be proven that there is a dominant pattern in his writing? VVhatever the 
unity of Klein's work, there is also a recurrent sort of nattering in it, a bit 
like Keats's, that one may eventually find annoying. (To be sure, his dread-
ful Grub Street existence gave Klein ample justification for bitterness and 
complaint.) But a reader may remain with a lingering discontent that does 
not only reflect Klein's personal unhappiness, or even his noble discontent 
with the inaccessibility of his goals. To admit the worst that can be said of 
Klein, his work can leave one more irritated than intrigued; his ideas may 
seem serious but not profound. 
It is a great virtue of Pollock's study that it does not indulge in careless 
praise. It is a book worked out in extraordinary detail, as I have said, to 
demonstrate a particular pattern in Klein's writing, and it is quick to point 
out the difficulties in which that pattern involves the poet. I will try to re-
peat this pattern as Pollock traces it. The unrolling of the (Torah) scroll leads 
towards truth, but never reaches it. Similarly, every dialectical process falls 
short of synthesis. The moment of suspense that follows this realization, the 
realization that completeness cannot be achieved, reveals an inherent flaw in 
the interpretive commentary in which both the artist, the Talmudist, and the 
philosopher are engaged. This pause, or rather the gap at the brink of con-
summation (for instance, the moment at which the artist expects to achieve 
symbiosis with his community), may in theory be leaped, but it can certainly 
never be bridged. The assumption that effort alone will lead one to the goal 
turns out to have been a mistake. In this light, the entire labour of Klein's 
difficult life is seen as if caught in a Kakaesque aporia, in a straining towards 
what in principle cannot be achieved. Where the pattern that Pollock finds in 
Klein differs from Kafka's is in its final phase; the effort to unroll the scroll is 
not maintained in the face of all discouragement, but is simply abandoned; 
the futile striving to reach the goal is given up; in fact, what ensues is an 
impulse to roll the scroll backwards, even to undo the consequences of the 
creative life; in fact, to negate the entire creative process. 
Despite its scholarly density, then, Pollock's account of the growth-and 
decline-of a poet's mind is to be read almost like a detective story: if one 
pays enough attention to the details, if one watches the permutations of 
"scroll," "dialectic," "oneness," and other such key words with unwavering 
attention, one will finally see how the pattern dominates and accounts for 
everything of importance that Klein wrote. It is an approach that, perhaps 
consciously, mimics the notorious paranoia of its subject, but it is also rea-
sonably convincing and very satisfying, though it demands a degree of com-
mitment to Pollock's argument that soon becomes exhausting. 
There is great value in this discriminating approach of Pollock's to the in-
terpretation of Klein. First, it makes Pollock hesitant to approve uncondition-
ally of anything that Klein wrote, and so rescues Klein from the uncritical 
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praise that can mask an author's idiosyncratic values. Second, it forces us to 
ask why an author who is suspended in a self-created limbo of imperfection 
can remain so compelling. The answer is clear: to attempt the impossible 
represents a noble effort. That is why Klein, much of whose writing is un-
readable, moves liS far more than most of the Canadian poets of his genera-
tion. We can feel in even his most awkward gestures, in his declamatory 
rhetoric, an unbroken seriousness of purpose. 
Pollock holds Klein to his own impossibly high standards, rejecting even 
his most satisfying poems (such as the three "Mount Royal" poems) as 
tainted with escapism (192-94). They achieve their lyric perfection by avoid-
ing certain harsh political realities. Not for a moment will Pollock hide be-
hind such obvious assets of Klein's style as his enormous multilingual 
vocabulary. Neither does he pretend that Klein's pioneering appreciation of 
Joyce and Hopkins exempts him from the ultimate demands of his own en-
terprise; nor does he find excuses for Klein's weaknesses in the terrible, 
draining and humiliating conditions under which he worked-conditions 
that, allowing for the differences, actually recall those under which Hopkins 
laboured. 
There will, no doubt, eventually be a biography that will provide more than 
scattered glimpses of this tonnented existence. Klein attended the same pri-
mary and secondary schools as well as the same college as I did (somewhat 
later), and he was a close friend of my mother's. (Conceming my mother, Ida 
Maza, see my Identity and Community [Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 
1994]). I knew his daughter, who died very YOlmg, when she was a slndent 
at McGill, but I have only two strong impressions of meeting with Klein 
himself. The first time was on the Park Avenue streetcar, returning from 
downtovvn. He was seated, and I remember his slightly smiling, dark, 
swarthy face. We exchanged small-talk, while I kept wondering how some-
one who was thought to be subject to mental illness could continue practic-
inglaw. 
In layers of mountains the history of mankind, 
and in Mount Royal 
which daily in a streetcar I surround 
my youth, my childhood-
the pissabed dandelion, the coolie acorn,-
are still to be found. 
("The Mountain," 7-11, 14) 
The second memory I have is of visiting Klein, who was now clearly un-
derstood to be ill, with my mother at his apartment. His wife was present. 
After some general conversation and some of a literary nature, Klein began 
to tell me about the schemes and machinations of the people upstairs, and 
how (with a knowing smile) he would foil them. Klein's "Psalm xxii: A 
Prayer of Abraham, against Madness" is a poor poem, and it gives one little 
sense of what his own later experience may have been like; but it reflects 
what must have been a constant preoccupation. 
Pollock identifies If Portrait of the Poet as Landscape" as Klein's most im-
Criticism, Vol. XXXVIII, No.2: Book Reviews 345 
portant poem, or, at least, as the one that defines Klein's role as poet most 
clearly. Pollock contrasts it (159 fl.) with the earlier "Out of the Pulver and 
the Polished Lens/' in which Spinoza's, the poet's model's, confident asser-
tion of God's unity and perfection is unequivocal. 
Think of Spinoza, rather, plucking hIlips 
Within the garden of Mynheer, forgetting 
Dutclllnen and Rabbins, and consumptive fretting, 
Picking his tulips in the Holland sun, 
Remembering the thought of the Adored, 
Spinoza, gatherin.g flowers for the One, 
The ever-unwedded lover of the Lord. 
(Last stanza) 
The tone of the "Portrait of the Poet as Landscape" is more ambiguous, or 
what Pollock would call more "dialecticaL" From the point of view of his 
community, the poet is now, at best, "a Mr. Smith in a hotel register" (27). 
But he himself remembers the begililling of his love affair with language, 
"his travels over that body-/ the torso verb, the beautiful face of the noun" 
(41--42) and tllinks perhaps he may still be brought into his own-"the un-
suspecting heir, with papers" (56), but it doesn't happen, and whatever his 
fears and his illusions, 
it is stark infelicity 
which stirs him from his sleep, undressed, asleep 
to walk upon roofs and window-sills. 
(130-32) 
Still, he wil1 carry out his role: to praise and so to recreate the world, like 
another Christopher Smart or Rilke: "Until it has been praised, that part/ has 
not been" (142-43). He climbs up on another planet to look dmvn on this 
ne\v earth of his, himself: "and this,! this, he would like to "nite down in a 
book!" (151-52). Like Wordsworth, a perpehlal debtor, he is desperate to "0, 
somehmv pay back the daily larcenies of the lung!" (158). Vvith much justifi-
cation, he states 
These are not mean ambitions. It is already something 
merely to entertain them. Ivleamvhile, he 
makes of his status zero a rich garland .... (159-6]) 
In a more playful mood, Klein can also \vrite poems ilbout refrigerators-
"A be\,y of milk, eoifed like the sisters of snow" ("Frigidaire," 10) or, for lhJt 
matter, about grain elevators, where lie 
the scruples of the sun 
garnered for darkness; 
the grain picked up, like tic-tJCS out of time: 
fir.st one; an other. 
("Grain Ele\'alo1'," 11-12, 18-19) 
But I find l11y~cIf returning m05t enn~i5tentI~· to the ".\-lount R()~·'lJ" PPL'Il1"-, 
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of which there are three. Escapist or subtly evasive they may be; but (pace 
Pollock) perhaps that does not disqualify them as poetry. 
Remembering boyhood, it is always here 
the boy in blouse and kneepants on the road 
trailing his stick over the hopscotched sun; 
or here, upon the suddenly moving hill; 
or at the turned tap its cold white mandarin mustaches; 
("Lookout: Mount Royal," 1-5) 
On a winter night a sleigh passes, and 
One would say the hidden stars were bells 
dangling between the shafts of the zodiac. 
One would say 
the snowflakes falling clinked together their sparkles 
to make these soft, these satin-muffled 
tintinnabulations. 
("Winter Night: Mount Royal," 26-31) 
In summer there are, on this mountain, buttercups that 
like once on the under of my chin 
upon my heart still tlrrow their rounds of yellow. 
One of these days I shall go up to the second terrace 
to see if it is still there-
the uncomfortable sentimental bench 
where-as we listened to the brass of the band concerts 
made soft and to our mood by dark and distance 
I told the girl I loved 
I loved her. 
("The Mountain," 16-17,37-43) 
Yet, elsewhere, Klein can reject memory, and declare that "No thing is what 
I vividly recall-" ("Of Remembrance," 24); and he is capable of harsh, imme-
diate, and practical poetry, without a trace of nostalgia. In fact, some of his best 
passages are to be found in the workmanlike poems about Quebec politics, no-
tably "Political Meeting: (For Camilien Houde)." (For a commentary on this 
poem see Pollock, 185-89). The demagogue rallies his xenophobic crowd, until 
(Outside, in the dark, the street is body-tall, 
flowered with faces intent on the scarecrow thing 
that shouts .... ) 
Political correctness goes, and poetry tells it like it is: 
111e whole street wears one facef 
(15-17) 
shadowed and grim; and in the darkness rises 
the body-odour of race. 
(38-40) 
I~ 
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A variant of this same theme appears, expressed in gentler language, in 
"TI,e Provinces" (lines 50-51): "the unity/in the family feature, the not un-
similar face." 
It may be fairly said that Klein's major preoccupation is with community; 
and, as Pollock points out Klein's attack on Houde does not preclude a 
strong identification with the communitarian values and experience of 
French Canadians. The "body odour of race" is a reality; it is the flavor 
through which the solidarity of a group is experienced. In that case it may 
have been, in fact it was, directly threatening to another group, the one that 
Klein represented; but it is nevertheless the basic means of identification: the 
smell of those we belong with, that keeps others at arm's length. Mild-man-
nered, inoffensive, and even sentimental as Klein at times seemed to be, he 
was yet able to call by its name, and thrust in our faces, the defining feature 
of our time. 
State University a/New York, Buffalo Irving Massey 
Femi11ist Perspectives 011 Jewish Studies edited by Lynn Davidman and Shelly 
Tenenbaum. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995. Pp. 304. 
$28.50. 
This volume, consisting of an introduction and ten essays, is the first at-
tempt to evaluate the impact of feminist scholarship on a number of the 
academic fields encompassed by the rubric "Jewish studies." In each instance 
the essays' authors address the state of knowledge about women and gender 
in tl1eir specific areas, consider the influence of such scholarship on the disci-
pline in general, and suggest new avenues for research. The academic areas 
discussed are biblical studies, rabbinic Judaism, Jewish theology, Jewish phi-
losophy, modern Jewish history, sociology of American Jews, anthropology, 
American-Jewish literature, modern Hebrew literature, and American 
cinema. 
As tl1e editors and authors of the essays in this provocative volume point 
out frequently, women's studies and Jewish studies are analogous disci-
plines both in their critical approaches to traditional knowledge, and in their 
status in the academic world. That the parameters of women's history and 
experience, and Jewish history and experience, respectively, often differ from 
those associated with the dominant men from \vhose point of view western 
history has generally been \vritten, is a significant point of correspondence. 
Similarly, the historical periodizations that characterize general cultural 
studies are not ahvays meaningful either for Jews or for women. Moreover, 
efforts over the past few decades to inh'oduce Jewish studies into the main-
stream liberal arts curriculum are analogous to similar endeavors vis-a.-vis 
women's studies. In both cases, the passage from marginal and parochial to 
an accepted place in the academic pantheon has been hesitant and haiting, 
even in an academic atmosphere celebratory of cultural diversity. 
GiYen this commonality of situation, it might appear surprising that the 
impact of feminist insights on many areas of Jewish Studies scholarship h<1s 
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so far been minor. However, as this volume reveals, the lack of integration of 
feminist perspectives has to do both with the conservative and almost her-
metic nature of many areas of Jewish studies, several of which are signifi-
cantly removed from the major theoretical discourses of the mainstreams of 
their fields, as well as with traditional negative Jewish attitudes towards 
women and learning. Rabbinic Judaism, which held sway over most Jewish 
communities from the sixth through the eighteenth century of our era, or-
dained rigid separations between male and female roles, and the status 
which pertains to each sex. In this patriarchal system, women were seen as 
connected to the realm of nature, as opposed to culture, and their activities 
were ideally confined to the private sphere of family and economic endeav-
ors. Jewish scholarship has almost always been written and taught from the 
point of view of the male Jew, and has accordingly documented his intellec-
tual concerns and achievements. In the most traditional fields of study dis-
cussed in this volume, such as rabbinics, Jewish philosophy, and the 
sociology of American Jews, and in academic studies in Israel in general, 
feminist approaches and concerns have thus far had virtually no impact. 
In other academic disciplines, too, interest in evaluating the role of gender 
as a category of analysis in studying Jewish social, economic, intellectual, or 
religious life, has come slowly. The nascent feminist critiques of traditional 
understandings of Jewish society, religion, and culture which have emerged 
are mainly a result of the increasing number of women who have entered 
various fields of Jewish scholarship in the past two decades, and of their re-
ceptivity to the concurrent growth of women's studies as a field of scholarly 
endeavor that has convincingly demonstrated' that gender is an essential con-
sideration in analyzing all aspects of human experience. 
In several instances, in fact, the major impetus towards gendered analyses 
of Jewish societies and texts has come from active feminist scholarship in the 
mainstreams of the fields under consideration. This is especially so in disci-
plines such as Jewish feminist theology, discussed in this volume by Judith 
Plaskow, which has been significantly shaped in reaction to Christian femi-
nist theology, and in biblical studies, where, as Tikva Frymer-Kensky points 
out, a variety of new voices-Catholics, Jews, Asians, Afro-Americans, Afri-
cans, and women-have brought about new ways of reading the Hebrew Bi-
ble and have exposed the so-called "objectivity" of earlier, primarily male 
Protestant scholars. This general turmoil in biblical studies she writes, has 
brought about an openness to solid feminist scholarship (16). Similar recep-
tivity is found in anthropology, with the result, according to Susan Sered, 
that anthropologists of Jewish societies have been far ahead of other Jewish 
studies scholars in asking serious questions about the implications of gender. 
She suggests that it is particularly in the still little explored area of investi-
gating Jewish women's particular religious beliefs and rituals that feminist 
Jewish anthropology will make its greatest contributions (171). 
In her essay on "Feminist Studies and Modem Jewish History," Paula 
Hyman writes that historians of Jewish societies have begun to investigate 
the ramifications of gender differences in virtually every era of Jewish his-
tory. She points, among other examples, to the work of Marion Kaplan who 
has questioned the commonly held assumption that Jews in imperial Ger-
many assimilated in a uniform way into the broader culture. Kaplan'S re-
r 
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search finds that assimilation was a process that applied to men more 
rapidly than to women. By retaining religious traditions in the home, provid-
ing their children with religious education, and maintaining kinship and 
community netvvorks, German Jewish women defined their identities in reli-
gious and ethnic terms whi1e the men in their lives were striving for political 
and economic integration into German society. 
Feminist literary criticism has also reshaped the ways in which teachers 
and students look at literary texts. Joyce Antler and Naomi Sokoloff, in their 
respective chapters on American-Jewish and Hebrew literatures, both point 
to the many insights being drawn from mainstream feminist literary theory 
in contelnporary scholarship on American-Jewish and Hebrew writing. They 
note, for example, the increased scholarly concentration on such dimensions 
of women's lives as mother/daughter relationships, adolescence, sexuality, 
and the consequences of male domination, in study of the works of impor-
tant American-Jewish and Israeli writers. Both mention, too, the growing in-
terest in the significant number of Jewish women who began to write 
creatively from the raw material of their own experiences and feelings in the 
past one hundred years. With this opportunity for self-realization came es-
trangement from a traditional Jewish culture which had strictly limited 
women's access to learning and literary accomplishment. Many Jewish 
women writers not only experienced the duality of living as marginalized 
women in a male-dominated Jewish culture, but also keenly felt the egually 
significant duality of being part of a Jewish minority in uncongenial cultural 
environments-often with detrimental results for their creative output. 
The essays in Feminist Perspectives on Jewish Studies are clearly written and 
copiously documented. They provide admirable general introductions to the 
academic fields of Jewish scholarship they discuss, in addition to their de-
tailed analyses of the present impact of feminist scholarship in these disci-
plines, and the desiderata for future scholarship they offer. This significant 
collection is part of a growing epistemological effort to acknowledge the con-
sequences of race, ethnicity, social class, and gender on people's lives and on 
their creative and spiritual endeavors. It will offer valuable insights to all 
readers interested in the scholarly impact of gender studies on traditional 
academic disciplines. 
The University of Albany, 
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